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The development of offensive cyber capabilities and organisations to deploy them is 
one of the most strategically significant issues facing governments as they come to 
terms with the technological revolution.
Offensive cyber raises profound challenges and choices of statecraft for governments 
everywhere in at least three different ways.
First is what it says about a nation’s strategic posture towards the internet. In what 
circumstances, and for what purposes, should governments exploit the online 
weaknesses of others? When should online information gathering – digital espionage 
– give way to active disruption? In a networked world, what impact does this 
activity have on our own cyber security and is there a trade-off between exploiting 
vulnerabilities in others and protecting your own citizens?
Second, how is such sensitive, risky and contentious activity governed? What does 
being a “democratic, responsible cyber power”, as the UK government asserts it 
is, mean, and who decides that? How do governments ensure their activities are 
responsible, and don’t promote instability and accidental harm on the internet? How 
does a lawful, democratic state gain informed public consent for what will often 
invariably be secretive operations?
 Finally, how is offensive cyber organised and run? Who is responsible for ensuring 
a realistic and deliverable set of capabilities in an area prone to hype? What should 
be the respective roles of intelligence, military and law enforcement? How do the 
long-standing Five Eyes intelligence partnerships, and newer partnerships with other 
countries, adapt to these new capabilities? How does political oversight work, and 
who is at the table to speak for cyber security and internet safety when offensive 
cyber is being discussed? And how does a nation ensure it has the right human capital 
– the leadership and skills – to deliver the objective?
The UK’s recent emphasis on offensive cyber in its Integrated Review of Defence, 
Security, Foreign and Development Policy, as well as the establishment of the 
National Cyber Force, means that it is imperative that Britain debates these issues. 
But the topic has received far too little public attention. That’s partly because the 
necessary operational secrecy around offensive cyber has afforded some protection 
from the normal mechanisms of scrutiny as policy has developed. But there is no good 
reason why the operating environment, the policies, the oversight, and in particular 
the strategic posture, cannot be openly debated. That is why this report from four 
outstanding scholars of cyberspace is so welcome.
Ultimately, the UK will have to account for its actions as an actor in cyberspace 
in all of these areas, and this excellent paper provides a crucial framework for how 
that should be done. It correctly concludes that the security of domestic cyberspace 
should retain primacy, and sets out a clear, hard-headed account of how the many 
challenges facing those tasked with building the National Cyber Force might be 
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Executive summary
Cyber operations are increasingly important to state power projection in the contested 
and competitive defence and security environments of the globalised 21st century. 
The United Kingdom has created a National Cyber Force (NCF) to assist in its 
ambitions to conduct offensive operations against hostile state actors, terrorists and 
serious organised criminals. This joint military-intelligence organisation will replace 
and streamline existing arrangements and will help the UK achieve full-spectrum 
effects in pursuit of detecting, disrupting and deterring its adversaries. The NCF is 
intended to be a key contributor to the UK’s desire to be an effective, responsible and 
democratic “cyber power” in global affairs. The broad remit of the NCF was outlined 
by the UK government in March 2021, but questions remain about the NCF’s role, 
responsibility, organisation and mission. This report identifies a set of core themes 
for the UK government to consider as the NCF begins its work as the spearhead of a 
revised and more proactive UK approach to adversaries in cyberspace.
Key findings
• Despite the significant emphasis on offensive cyber in recent UK government 
publications and statements, ambitions for the NCF should be realistic. Plans 
should recognise that offensive cyber is but one of several components of cyber 
strategy. The starting point for national “cyber power” should be cyber security. 
Offensive cyber capability occupies an important but subordinate place in 
national cyber strategy.
• The NCF has a wide variety of possible missions, countering state threats, 
terrorism and serious and organised crime. It cannot pursue all these missions 
equally well. Priorities will need to be determined. A balance of counter-cyber 
operations and support to military operations is arguably the best (and least 
controversial) use of the NCF. 
• The NCF is the latest iteration of a slow and sometimes difficult process of 
inter-departmental development of UK offensive cyber organisation. As it grows, 
the NCF will need to be mindful of its historical development, diverse cultures 
and their contribution to the whole organisation. This should inform any future 
direction of travel, such as on continued joint status (predominantly between the 
Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Government Communications Headquarters 
(GCHQ)), or the NCF becoming principally a defence entity.
• The joint nature of the NCF raises the question of how its priorities are agreed. 
There is a compelling argument for active coordination from the centre of 
government, both from senior officials and ministers. The future of UK offensive 
cyber should not be decided by competition between the NCF’s constituent 
departments but holistically by ministers.
• Like other areas of UK defence and intelligence, offensive cyber is international 
by design. The NCF will continue to collaborate closely with allies such as 
US Cyber Command and the UK government has repeatedly emphasised 
its commitment to contribute cyber capabilities within the NATO alliance. 
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what will continue to require sovereign capabilities. The UK has committed 
to discussions on international norms development and the application of 
international law relevant to responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, including 
offensive cyber operations.
Recommendations
With limited resources the NCF must be well-equipped, both in terms of informed 
strategic decision-making and in operational terms. The structure, scope and 
capability development undertaken by the NCF must strike the right balance 
in contributing to the UK’s “more integrated, creative and routine”1 use of 
tools including offensive cyber capabilities. Our recommendations are made in 
four categories: government and accountability, organisational configuration, 
international cooperation, and mission focus.
Governance and accountability
Effective ministerial and senior official leadership will be crucial for informed 
decision-making around offensive cyber operations (OCOs). We recommend the UK 
government:
• Ensures that its ministerial small group for cyber delivers the leadership required 
to provide top-level accountability and strategic direction. 
• Conducts a review of ministerial portfolios containing cyber responsibilities across 
government.
• Appoints a deputy National Security Adviser for Cyber, enabling central strategic 
thinking.
Organisational configuration
To enable a clear organisational configuration relating to mission focus and 
institutional structure, we recommend the UK government: 
• Establishes clarity about NCF mission priorities for offensive cyber operations, 
including the process for allocating effort according to strategic priorities.
• Carefully plansthe proposed relocation of the NCF HQ to effectively mitigate 
short-medium term impact on its workforce and operations.
• Conducts a Cabinet Office-led cross-government audit across defence, security 
and intelligence agencies and departments.
International cooperation
Within a contested global landscape, we recommend the UK government does the 
following to strengthen international cooperation relating to OCOs: 
• Continues existing strategic cooperation (with the Five Eyes and NATO) for 
example) and identify new cyber expertise-based partnerships with like-minded 
nations.
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• Be proactive and transparent about the purpose and functions of the NCF in 
relevant international diplomacy.
• Demonstrates through operational practice and diplomacy its commitment to 
reducing cyber conflict by adherence to international law.
Mission focus
The NCF will need a clear and well-scoped mission focus to be effective. We 
recommend: 
• A proportionate NCF mission focus, not exacerbating the militarisation of 
cyberspace, and operating within clear legal and ethical frameworks. 
• The majority of NCF operations should consist of persistent, low-level counter-
cyber operations, rather than the more controversial practice of targeting 
adversaries’ critical infrastructure 
• The UK government should continually review and assess the NCF’s 
effectiveness and adjust mission focus if necessary, including to meet its legal and 
ethical obligations.
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The UK is undergoing a period of reflection relating to its desired role in the current 
global security context. The domestic challenges of Brexit, the coronavirus pandemic 
and constraints on public expenditure are set against a global backdrop of increased 
uncertainty and potentially significant threats to national and international security. 
Amidst multiple corrosive challenges to the international order that has served the 
UK well, one remains peculiarly difficult to address and resolve: the cyber threat 
posed by state and non-state entities determined to undermine national security and 
prosperity through the malicious use of digital technologies. Whether compromising 
critical national infrastructure such as energy and transport, or distortion of public 
debate and opinion, hostile actors seek to profit – strategically and financially – from 
exploiting our ubiquitous dependence on computation, much linked to the Internet.
The quandary for policymakers is this: if the UK accepts that every country has the 
right to develop and deploy a variety of means – diplomatic, informational, military, 
economic, and beyond – to counter and combat threats to its security, where in 
this complex mix of competences should an offensive cyber capability lie? Such a 
capability would give the UK the ability to proactively deny and degrade the cyber 
capabilities of hostile actors, disrupt their cyber operations, pursue fully integrated 
multi-domain operations, and, ultimately, offer the potential to deter threats to a 
hyper-connected digital economy in the 21st century.
This report outlines the UK’s existing offensive cyber capacity and provides 
recommendations to situate the National Cyber Force (NCF) in an evolving 
environment. Although operational details are scarce, the UK has been open about 
its strategic intent with respect to offensive cyber capabilities, as reasserted in the 
recent Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (Integrated 
Review). 2 The UK has reorganised its arrangements for offensive cyber over the last 
decade, building on the skills and expertise of various bodies including the military, 
police and intelligence communities. It has deployed offensive capabilities against 
criminal entities and in integrated military operations with some success, particularly 
in partnership with allies. The UK has indicated repeatedly that it will retaliate, 
including with punitive cyber means, against adversaries that transgress acceptable 
bounds of behaviour in cyberspace.
To these ends, in 2020 the UK created a new force, the NCF, building principally 
on the dual operational and oorganisational experience of GCHQ and the MoD, 
the historical lead agencies of the UK’s offensive cyber mission. It also includes 
specialism from the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6) as well as the Defence 
and Science Technology Laboratory (Dstl), reflecting the breadth of skills and 
capabilities in human intelligence, applied science and covert technology required 
to execute offensive cyber operations. In almost all government communications, 
the NCF is presented as a joint military-intelligence partnership. As many informed 
commentators assert, this was a sensible and predictable next step in UK cyber 
organisation, though there are residual, yet important, questions about precisely 
what the NCF is for. “Global Britain”, asserts the UK government in the Integrated 
Review, is “best defined by actions rather than words”. 3 If this is true, what should 
the NCF do and where does offensive cyber fit in the strategic toolbox of the UK as 
a “responsible, democratic cyber power” in the 21st century? How too will the NCF 




challenges of Brexit, the 
coronavirus pandemic 
and constraints on 
public expenditure are 
set against a global 
backdrop of increased 
uncertainty”
8 The National Cyber Force that Britain Needs? | April 2021
feed into and promote the “whole-of-nation effort” in cyber security promoted in the 
Integrated Review?4
This report recommends concrete actions that the UK government can take with 
respect to the NCF. These are arrayed across four core themes: governance and 
accountability, organisational configuration, international cooperation, and mission 
focus, all of which additionally work towards the improved cyber security of the 
whole UK. The report recommends: a thorough assessment of who is responsible 
for strategic cyber security engagement across government; that the role and 
responsibilities of the NCF are articulated clearly in principle and in relation to 
other actors; that fostering international cooperation is key to both the potential 
success of the NCF and to developing norms of responsible state behaviour in respect 
to offensive cyber operations; and that regular assessments of NCF activities are 
undertaken to ensure efficacy over time. Moreover, offensive cyber operations should 
not be regarded as a technological “fix” to problems that are resistant to resolution by 
these capabilities.
Background to the report
This report is based on a research project undertaken in 2020-21 by the King’s 
College London (KCL) Cyber Security Research Group (CSRG) and the UK 
Offensive Cyber Working Group (OCWG). CSRG is affiliated with the KCL 
Cybersecurity Centre Academic Centre of Excellence in Cyber Security Research 
(ACE-CSR) and the KCL School of Security Studies.5 The OCWG is a UK-based 
academia-led initiative examining the conceptual, policy and practical implications 
of offensive cyber activity in the UK.6 The project was funded by the Economic and 
Social Research Council’s Impact Acceleration Account, administered by the Policy 
Institute at King’s College London. The project aimed to produce an independent 
evaluation of the National Cyber Force structure and role as currently understood, 
and to propose a set of recommendations for the UK government as it develops 
the National Cyber Force against the backdrop of the Integrated Review of Security, 
Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (Integrated Review).
Structure
The remainder of this report consists of four main sections. Section 2 explores 
the operational landscape that suggests the need for a sovereign offensive cyber 
capability; it traces the development of this capability through to the establishment 
of the joint military-intelligence National Cyber Force. Section 3 looks at how 
international law, ethical and normative frameworks, and the UK’s alliance 
relationships, help shape the UK’s offensive cyber posture. Section 4 outlines four 
considerations as the NCF enters its operational phase and further integration into the 
national cyber mission: governance and accountability; organisational configuration; 
international cooperation; and mission focus. Section 5 concludes this report with a 
final set of reflections and recommendations.
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The historical development of cyber security in the UK indicates that the British government sees 
operational and strategic utility in strengthening national offensive cyber capacity. This section first 
establishes the operational landscape in which a sovereign offensive capability is deemed necessary. 
It then outlines how this capability has emerged since 2010, rooted as it is in long-term military-
intelligence cooperation. The third subsection details the establishment of the NCF and points towards 
questions about its identity, size and mission.
Operational landscape
Since the 2010 National Security Risk Assessment, the UK government has 
consistently regarded cyber threats as top (Tier 1) national security priorities. In 
addition to national security strategies (2010, 2015), the UK has implemented two 
iterations of national cyber security strategy (2011, 2016), with a third expected 
in 2021. These and other UK government statements identify three primary types 
of hostile actor that pose cyber threats to the UK: adversary foreign states, serious 
organised criminals, and terrorist organisations.7 Each category presents a different 
range of resources, capabilities and objectives:
• Adversary foreign states: State actors and state-sponsored groups are politically 
motivated to access or disrupt government and critical infrastructure. States 
conduct military, espionage, subversion and influence operations through cyber 
means, as well as connecting with cybercriminals and proxies for diverse strategic 
and operational purposes, especially if this permits states to claim “plausible 
deniability” if their involvement is suspected.
• Serious organised criminals: Whilst cybercrime can be low-level and 
opportunistic, serious cyber fraud, theft and extortion are carried out by 
organised crime groups from such regions as Eastern Europe (including Russia), 
South Asia and West Africa. Cybercriminals are motivated by profit and use 
cyber means to effect traditional crimes (cyber-enabled crime) and to develop 
new forms of criminality in which information technologies are the platforms and 
targets of crime (cyber-dependent crime).
• Terrorist organisations: Terrorists have yet to leverage computer networks for 
destructive purposes (cyberterrorism) but are adept at using the internet for 
radicalisation, recruitment, fundraising and command-and-control (internet 
terrorism). The current absence of cyberterrorism is a poor guide to the future 
and terrorists will continue to seek impactful cyber capabilities.
This typology is not exhaustive. For instance, the “insider threat” posed to 
organisations by employees and contractors with a combination of internal 
knowledge and the motivation to harm is also considered important, as is the general 
risk of everyday users’ poor cyber security practices through ineffective design.8 
Systemically, the recent SolarWinds and Microsoft Exchange compromises highlight 
the risks posed by the reliance of public and private sector entities on enterprise 
infrastructure that is not only subject to persistent malicious activity but also 
undermined by poor alignment between market incentives and the need for good 
cyber security.9
2. The UK case for cyber
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All cyber threat actors operate across a complex landscape that maps poorly to 
sovereign borders or discrete legal jurisdictions. When defensive countermeasures 
are deployed by the UK, these are readily restricted to UK-based networks, within 
a “permissive” environment where government can expect assistance in achieving 
its goals. One such example is the Active Cyber Defence programme that aims 
to reduce, through largely automated means, the harm to the UK from high-
volume, low-impact “commodity cyber attacks”, which typically address low-level 
cybercrime.10 More proactive operations, whether pursuing or disrupting cybercrime, 
conducting digital counterintelligence, or military cyber operations – any of which 
can be considered “offensive” – frequently occur outside UK networks. Like 
international espionage, forays into allies’ networks may be permitted by custom or 
by formal diplomatic mechanisms, but offensive cyber operations of necessity occur in 
whole or in part in foreign or hostile “non-permissive” environments. They intervene 
in a range of problematic sites and situations, each with distinct jurisdictional, legal, 
diplomatic and ethical implications.
UK national strategy reserves the right to conduct these operations, subject to 
operational necessity and international law. The development of an offensive cyber 
capability to pursue and punish adversaries is an overt strand of the “Deter” pillar 
of the 2016 national cyber security strategy, ensuring that the UK has “the means 
to take offensive action in cyberspace, should we choose to do so”.11 Furthermore, 
“Offensive cyber forms part of the full spectrum of capabilities we will develop to 
deter adversaries and to deny them opportunities to attack us, in both cyberspace and 
the physical sphere”.12 The presence of such “systemic competition” between multiple 
actors complicates distinctions between war and peace and manifests as competition 
short of “open confrontation or conflict”.13 As in other similarly capable countries, 
the UK sees offensive cyber as an essential component of its operational and strategic 
toolbox.
Organisational development
UK offensive cyber operations emerged collaboratively between multiple actors, 
principally GCHQ and MoD. Differing organisational priorities have shaped 
operational roles and responsibilities, including institutional perspectives on how and 
when offensive cyber capabilities should be used. GCHQ is primarily an intelligence 
agency, developing capabilities to collect information; its “effects” mission, to use 
its capabilities to achieve other objectives, was always secondary. In contrast, the 
primary mission of MoD – although it has significant intelligence capabilities – is 
to defend the UK, by force where necessary. Cyber capabilities were developed 
earlier by GCHQ, given its longer experience of computer network operations, but 
it also continues to discharge its support mission to MoD.14 The “prehistory” of UK 
offensive cyber operations remains untold, although inevitably pre-dates their avowal 
by the UK in September 2013, the first country to do so.15 The 2010 Strategic Defence 
and Security Review (SDSR), for instance, announced improved coordination of military 
cyber developments, including the use of reservists. It made no overt reference to 
“offensive” cyber, although this was arguably implicit in references to integrating new 
cyber capabilities with conventional non-cyber capabilities.16
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By 2015, the SDSR/National Security Strategy was referring to a joint GCHQ/
MoD cyber collaboration as the National Offensive Cyber Programme (NOCP).17 
Reportedly created in 2014, the NOCP was to be funded in part by the £1.9 billion 
allocated for the second iteration of the National Cyber Security Programme 
(NCSP).18 The Chancellor of the Exchequer described the NOCP as “a dedicated 
ability to counter-attack in cyberspace”; he warned “individual hackers, criminal 
gangs, terrorist groups and hostile powers” that the UK would “defend ourselves” and 
“take the fight to you too.”19 The rhetoric of deterrence and reaction was a persistent 
theme in senior ministerial speeches about the development of a national offensive 
cyber capability. The Defence Secretary in 2016 stated: “It is important that our 
adversaries know there is a price to pay if they use cyber weapons against us, and 
that we have the capability to project power in cyberspace as in other domains.”20 
He would only say then that the UK had “begun to integrate offensive cyber into our 
military planning alongside the full range of military effects.”21 In 2017, however, he 
announced that the UK was now “using offensive cyber routinely in the war against 
Daesh” in Iraq and Syria.22
It is unclear to what extent NOCP operations were coordinated with those of US 
Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), although the two countries in September 2016 
signed a memorandum of understanding on defensive and offensive cyber capability 
development.23 As part of Operation Glowing Symphony from November 2016, 
USCYBERCOM reportedly conducted “a rolling series of propaganda takedowns 
and account lockouts” against Daesh/Islamic State.24 USCYBERCOM has 
subsequently acted against Russian disinformation operations prior to and during the 
US 2018 midterm elections.25 From 2018, the UK would also declare that Russia was 
a legitimate target of offensive cyber operations, not least on account of Russia’s own 
information and cyber operations.26
Establishing a National Cyber Force
In September 2018, the government pledged £250 million to move beyond the 
NOCP and create the NCF, with ambitious plans to increase its size from an initial 
operating capacity of 500 to 2000 personnel.27 This followed the March 2018 
Salisbury attack and a revitalised government focus on countering and deterring 
hostile state actors, particularly Russia, an approach formalised in the Integrated 
Review. Government sources increasingly presented cyber capabilities as an important 
element in the UK’s response to Russia.28 A senior Whitehall official later appeared to 
suggest that offensive cyber operations were indeed used in response to the Russian 
threat.29 Yet, the NCF was more than a reaction to the perceived increase in the 
threat from Russia and other hostile state actors. Former senior intelligence and cyber 
officials suggested that the NCF was a logical attempt to optimise effectiveness and 
efficiency through an integrated civilian-military organisation tailored to the resources 
available in the UK system.30 Since 2010, successive governments have attempted 
to protect cyber from the impact of reduced public expenditure, whether the fallout 
from the global financial crisis then, or the coronavirus pandemic now. In each case, 
the government has committed to increasing offensive cyber capacity but has had to 
keep the size of the NOCP/NCF small and augment it with reservists.31
£250 million
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This opens the questions of what the revamped NCF is for and how large it will 
need to be to meet its mission requirements. In 2019, the National Audit Office 
reported that the UK had “routinely used offensive cyber to counter the threat from 
terrorism. This has had a significant effect on degrading Daesh capabilities.” 32 It is 
unclear whether the emphasis on counterterrorism operations reflects the operational 
prioritisation of NOCP/NCF missions, or if the sensitivity of avowing operations 
against state actors prevents a wider discussion of targeting and mission success. 
Whatever the situation, when the Prime Minister announced on 19 November 
2020 that the NCF was operational, he stated it would target not only terrorists, 
but serious organised criminals and hostile state actors. This wider mission set 
would be accompanied by an increase in NCF personnel to 3000 by 2030.33 This 
seems to imply a larger number of NCF operations, the ability to conduct more 
sophisticated operations, or longer offensive cyber campaigns. To a large extent, 
this will be determined by the capacity to grow the NCF in terms of personnel and 
the competition across other strategic national missions at GCHQ or MoD, plus the 
broader cyber security environment in the private sector.
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The UK views offensive cyber as an integral part of its sovereign capability. It capitalises upon the 
experience of joint military-intelligence organisation and operations, as well as creating opportunities 
for future synergies and operational vigour. In considering the precise disposition and tasking of the 
National Cyber Force – what the UK wants the NCF to achieve and how – we examine what the 
NCF can realistically do, given the constraints and opportunities of the international structures 
in which the UK is embedded. The following section looks at how international law, ethical and 
normative frameworks and the UK’s alliance obligations shape the choices facing the UK as it 
develops its offensive cyber posture.
International law
The UK has argued consistently that its national cyber security objectives will be 
pursued through adherence to domestic and international law, a standard it also 
expects of others.34 This includes offensive cyber capabilities, which “can be deployed 
at a time and place of our choosing, for both deterrence and operational purposes, 
in accordance with national and international law.”35 As the Attorney General 
stated in a widely reported speech in May 2018, states have the right to develop 
sovereign offensive capabilities, and to defend themselves against hostile cyber 
actions, but they must be “governed by law just like activities in any other domain.”36 
The 2016 National Cyber Security Strategy notes that other states, by way of contrast, 
have deployed offensive cyber capabilities and may do so “in contravention of 
international law in the belief that they can do so with relative impunity, encouraging 
others to follow suit.”37 UK efforts in respect of international law as pertaining to 
offensive cyber consists of two main fields: convincing others of the applicability of 
international law to cyber operations; and determining precisely how international 
law applies to those activities.
Ostensibly, the first of these workstreams is already well developed. In 2013, 
the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on information security agreed 
that customary international law applied in its entirety to state cyber operations. 
Two years later, it affirmed that the UN Charter and the tenets of international 
humanitarian law (IHL) that govern warfare – necessity, proportionality, humanity, 
distinction – apply in cyberspace.38 The NATO-sponsored Tallinn Manual Process 
also confirmed that all international law always applies to state cyber operations.39 
A host of multilateral and multistakeholder groups and organisations support this 
position. However, three GGE members – US, China, Russia – refused to sign 
the 2018 “Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace” that reaffirms the 
GGE position.40 Whilst the US stance might have been a function of the Trump 
administration’s antipathy to multilateralism, it also suggests that the US position 
on international law, whilst affirmed in most contexts, is not settled entirely. 
These developments are demonstrably more a question of “how” rather than “if” 
international law applies, where recent US debates have centred around how 
differing interpretations of “sovereignty” in international law enable or forbid digital 
interventions in non-permissive environments.41 
The UK position is clearer and, in addition to IHL justifications for offensive 
cyber operations in armed conflict, the Attorney General drew specific attention 
to UN Charter provisions prohibiting under normal (non-war) circumstances the 
interference by one state in the domestic affairs of another, including through cyber 
3. UK offensive cyber in a global context
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means; the right to respond to states undertaking such activities in UK territory; and 
the right to self-defence should a cyber operation “result in, or present an imminent 
threat of, death and destruction on an equivalent scale to an armed attack”.42 
Offensive cyber operations offer flexibility of response to a wide range of threats of 
differing severity, including electoral manipulation by a foreign power, threats to 
“critical infrastructure”, or indeed any illegal act prosecuted through conventional 
means. The UK does not believe that any such countermeasures – which cannot 
amount to a use of force – require prior notification to the targeted state party. 
Although this applies only to situations involving states, customary international law 
– and treaty mechanisms – would also regulate the use of cross-border offensive cyber 
operations to thwart cybercrime, although the international governance of counter-
cybercrime is uneven and lacks global harmonisation.43
Ethics and norms
The UK supports the development and deployment of offensive cyber capabilities 
in times of war and peace subject to international law. It also promotes adherence to 
international law as a norm of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, including 
the legal use of offensive cyber capabilities. However, the UK’s position expresses 
clearly that offensive cyber capabilities can be used if certain conditions are met but 
says rather less about if they should be. The consensus position of the 2015 GGE, for 
instance, articulates five “limiting norms”, including that states should not conduct or 
support activity that impairs or “intentionally damages critical infrastructure”, as well 
as preventing “the use of harmful hidden functions”.44 These would seem to disbar 
offensive cyber operations of various kinds except, of course, when national interests 
demand otherwise. UK discussion – at least in public – tends to assume the probity 
of the latter without concerning itself too much with the former. In this sense, the 
“strategic promise” of offensive cyber is running ahead of the more granular ethical 
debate.45
The UK has committed to the NCF carrying out cyber operations in a “legal, 
ethical and proportionate way”.46 The language of ethical cyber operations does not 
surface in the Integrated Review, however, and the UK’s commitment to developing 
and socialising norms of responsible state behaviour would be well-served by clear 
articulation of its ethical position concerning where and when offensive cyber 
operations will be considered operational possibilities. Publicly and explicitly 
highlighting ethical considerations beyond traditional military concepts – just war 
theory, for instance – and international law, would encourage deeper domestic 
engagement on these issues, as well as signalling to other states the importance of 
ethical frameworks for the planning and execution of offensive cyber operations. 
This could encourage virtuous feedback loops in which ethics and norms co-evolve, 
such as to incorporate “kill-switches” in operational computer code, that in turn help 
shape national cyber postures and operations.47 It would also indicate that the ethics 
of offensive cyber operations are just as important as international legal deliberations: 
ethical challenges are not necessarily soluble through law. Offensive cyber operations 
may be legally permitted in certain circumstances and environments, but this does 
not mean they are always the ethical course of action.48 The UK’s strategic posture 
sensibly allows for flexibility in its choice of response mechanisms, including to hostile 
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Military cyber operations arguably pose the fewest ethical puzzles, as they are already 
subject to IHL. Offensive cyber actions, for instance, may be “more ethical” than 
conventional means in certain military contexts, if they can achieve their desired 
effects whilst causing less harm than kinetic capabilities, or even prevent harm; this 
may make their use obligatory.49 Equally, if military effects cannot be achieved by 
an offensive cyber action without risking harm to non-combatants, should it go 
ahead? The picture is rather more nuanced in the non-war situations in which the 
NCF will predominantly operate.50 In response to demonstrable hostile acts, the 
case is relatively easy to make for targeting adversaries’ operational infrastructures 
(“counterforce”, in nuclear jargon), but if offensive cyber is to be used as a form of 
signalling or coercion, this may require holding at risk “countervalue” targets like 
civilian infrastructure. What are the material consequences of such actions, and the 
second-order emotional or cognitive effects on civilians? Importantly, would such 
actions be in tension, or possibly undermine, the UK’s normative commitments and 
its general support for a rules-based approach to international behaviour? There are 
many other issues deserving of an ethico-political analysis, including the approach 
taken to vulnerabilities discovered by UK government operators.51 This all points to 
the need in policy and practice to ensure that all NCF personnel are situated within 
an ethical and moral practice. They should regard a general level of “ethical literacy” 
as a recurring requirement of their roles.
Alliances
The NCF will not operate in a vacuum. It is deeply enmeshed in an enduring 
network of alliances and partnerships, most notably with European neighbours 
and the US, and as a member of NATO and the Five Eyes (FVEY) Anglophone 
intelligence alliance (comprising the UK, US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand). 
By necessity, the NCF must be attentive to, and often integrate with, the offensive 
cyber capabilities, doctrines and postures of its allies, whilst developing its own stance 
that reflects UK national interests, ambitions and obligations. In some situations, 
such as FVEY, this is primarily an intelligence-sharing arrangement characterised 
by a significant degree of trust between allies. Whilst this has delivered significant 
operational benefits for over 70 years, it has also been challenged by allegations of 
shared impropriety (Edward Snowden) and by disagreements over specific issues, 
most recently over Huawei and 5G. The arrangement is unusually robust, though, 
and will persist, perhaps even developing common strategic positions around offensive 
cyber, as well as enhanced operational relationships.
One potential challenge to operational coherence in cyber operations – as opposed 
to alliance cohesion – concerns the US’ doctrinal shift to “persistent engagement”.52 
This requires US Cyber Command and others to engage constantly with adversaries 
in order to inflict costs on potential and actual attackers. An inherent aspect of 
this is the need to “defend forward” that implies – although interpretations are not 
settled in the US – operating outside domestic US networks in non-permissive 
environments to deny, distract and frustrate adversaries’ operating capabilities.53 
This is not an inherently offensive posture, but the apparent normalisation of extra-
jurisdictional operations hints at the tension between perceived operational necessity 
and international normative and legal obligations. The question for the UK is how 
far to align itself with US posture, including as that posture develops under the Biden 
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administration.54 Indications in UK strategy suggest an unproblematic application of 
“persistent engagement” across defence, although the cyber component of this effort 
is referred to only as “contesting the cyber domain to protect our networks”.55
It remains unclear how this more proactive approach will be welcomed by other 
important allies, or indeed how it might be emulated by adversaries.56 France makes 
a clear distinction between offensive and defensive cyber, for instance, that is blurred 
significantly by persistent engagement.57 Germany has historically been reluctant 
to relax its constitutional restraints on military cyber operations and articulates a 
cautious approach to offensive cyber.58 Close allies like Norway and the Netherlands 
also differ in their approaches to military offensive cyber.59 Whilst these perspectives 
do not affect offensive cyber equally across all its likely manifestations, it may affect 
offensive cyber in support of military operations in a formal alliance like NATO, of 
which all these countries are members. NATO aims to have a fully operational Cyber 
Operations Centre (CyOC) by 2023, which will provide defensive and offensive 
cyber mission support.60 This will rely on integrating “national cyber effects or 
offensive cyber into Alliance operations and missions”.61 The UK has committed to 
declare its offensive cyber capabilities to NATO under its Article V commitment to 
the Alliance.62 Any issues with divergent doctrinal, legal or constitutional barriers 
to capability-sharing and interoperability are addressed in joint doctrine and a 
formal mechanism called Sovereign Cyber Effects Provided Voluntarily by Allies 
(SCEPVA).63 However, NATO is under civilian control and the politics of offensive 
cyber deployment, including by NCF, will not always defer to military doctrine.
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The foregoing discussion suggests multiple opportunities to develop a distinct role for the National 
Cyber Force in delivering operational and strategic effects consistent with UK national aims and 
objectives. To do so, it must consider: the nature of the operational environment; the idiosyncrasies 
of the UK defence and security landscape, including resource constraints; its international legal 
and alliance obligations; and the importance of maintaining and promoting behavioural norms 
and ethics. This section outlines four specific considerations for UK decision-makers as the NCF 
enters its operational phase and further integration into the national cyber mission: governance and 
accountability; organisational configuration; international cooperation; and mission focus. None of 
these factors is a wholly discrete category and all should be viewed as mutually supporting in multiple 
ways.
Governance and accountability 
As with other aspects of UK cyber strategy, offensive cyber would benefit from 
reviewing existing arrangements for ministerial accountability and coordination by 
senior officials at the centre of government. The last two iterations of the National 
Cyber Security Strategy were developed under the National Security Council 
(NSC) process established in 2010. The NSC process remains in place, but its 
significance has fluctuated under successive prime ministers, each of whom has used 
it differently. For several years, a ministerial sub-committee of the NSC, chaired by a 
senior minister, oversaw cyber strategy. This sub-committee appears not to have met 
since Boris Johnson became prime minister in July 2019. 
The Integrated Review announced that a ministerial small group has subsequently been 
formed “to cohere cyber decision-making across government.”64 This reversal is 
welcome, but the government should clarify the group’s membership and remit and 
review its supporting structures to ensure it provides the necessary strategic direction 
for cyber decision-making. If not already the case, it should again be chaired by a 
senior minister – perhaps either the Prime Minister or Chancellor of the Exchequer 
– to avoid or resolve conflicts between MoD and the Foreign Office over who should 
have precedence in offensive cyber operations. The joint capability has historically 
suffered from a “long and difficult battle between GCHQ and the Ministry of 
Defence over authority” for specific operations, reflecting the military-intelligence 
mix of offensive cyber.65 The confirmation that MoD will be the biggest contributor 
to the NCF perhaps indicates a shift in bureaucratic influence away from GCHQ and 
must be actively managed from the centre of government.66
Improvement to ministerial leadership in cyber should extend below the strategic 
NSC level to everyday ministerial oversight. Cyber security is currently allocated 
across a wide range of ministerial portfolios. Greater focus and coherence could be 
achieved with a network of dual- or even triple-hatted cyber ministers responsible for 
coordinating the multiple agencies and departments closely involved with offensive 
cyber (and broader cyber security) strategy. This cross-departmental mode might 
help reduce the risk of competition over resource allocation and policy direction. 
In addition to streamlining ministerial responsibilities, the UK could benefit from 
attention to senior official appointments and coordinating secretariats at the heart of 
government.
4. A distinct UK approach
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Amidst several reorganisations of senior national security roles in the last decade 
– often to reflect the priorities of a new National Security Adviser (NSA) – the 
number of deputy NSAs has fluctuated. Several have included cyber within their 
wider portfolios, but there has not yet been a Director General-level official in the 
Cabinet Office with a sole mandate for cyber strategy and coordination. The new 
NSA (March 2021) should appoint a deputy NSA for Cyber, equivalent to the 
White House creation of a similar role in January 2021.67 A senior cyber official at 
the heart of government, appropriately supported, could improve long-term cyber 
coordination. This would help to formalise the process for addressing areas of policy 
in which competing priorities, the balance of UK security, or departmental interests 
collide, including around offensive cyber operations.68
Organisational configuration
The NCF comprises organisations with different resources, expertise, legal 
authorisations, organisational cultures, and operational backgrounds. The NCF 
commander is from GCHQ, reflecting the weight of capability and experience in 
conducting cyber operations that GCHQ brings to the collaboration.69 However, the 
NCF is not part of GCHQ – unlike NCSC – and GCHQ is not, formally at least, 
first among equals. It is difficult to forecast confidently how organisational differences 
will shape the working relationship and mission priorities (see below) of the NCF, 
particularly as MoD will contribute more of the funding for the NCF.70 
Dedicated senior cyber officials at the centre of government will help to arbitrate 
disputes and act as honest brokers if protracted disagreements require elevation and 
ministerial resolution. The NCF presently operates under a range of different legal 
authorities, depending on whether the Foreign Secretary or the Defence Secretary is 
required to authorise particular operations. At this stage, the implications of divided 
departmental equities are unclear. Ultimately, the decision about NCF utility and 
identity must be political judgements and the responsibility of senior ministers. 
Nevertheless, the views of officials from NCF constituent parties – those most steeped 
in the practicalities of offensive cyber operations – will shape the options put to 
ministers and the briefings that shape their understanding and decision-making.
Given the ambition to increase NCF personnel to 3000 by 2030, there must be 
clear understanding of why this is necessary and how such growth will be achieved. 
Different workforce strategies will produce different cohorts whatever the total 
number. Is the priority to increase the number of high-end operators and developers, 
or to accelerate growth by rapid hiring of less-skilled operators? Each implies 
different outcomes in terms of the number and sophistication of possible NCF 
operations.71 The UK has, despite some progress, struggled to overcome barriers to 
the development of career cyber professionals in the services.72 The Chief of Defence 
Staff announced in 2019 that the MoD would pursue “unified career management” 
to create “blended career fields” for uniformed and civilian personnel, including 
in cyber. 73 In addition, the MoD has tried to better integrate reservists’ skills and 
experiences in its cyber force.74 This has offset some of the adverse effects of shedding 
labour during the period of austerity.75 The Joint Cyber Reserve created in 2013 
helped address this and will presumably play an important role in the NCF.76
3,000
National Cyber Force 
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NCF recruitment and retention decisions may affect GCHQ and MoD’s cyber 
intelligence and cyber security missions. These should be explored in a cross-
government audit of cyber workforce strategy, aligned with the Whole Force concept 
that includes civilians, armed personnel, reservists and contractors. This is a problem 
that transcends the national defence and intelligence community. The government 
recognises the need to nurture the development of a national pipeline of cyber talent, 
for example in its recent creation of the independent UK Cyber Security Council.77 
There is a clear requirement, here as elsewhere, for government to integrate its 
offensive cyber priorities with its wider cyber priorities – an intention at least that 
some commentators have inferred from the language of the Integrated Review.78
The Integrated Review committed to establishing a new NCF headquarters in 
the North of England, as part of a broader policy to increase technology-related 
employment across the UK regions.79 This is consistent with existing decisions to 
move central government officials out of London, such as the 750 staff from HM 
Treasury due to relocate to Darlington.80 Whilst this suggests other factors have 
contributed to the decision, it is important to consider the possible impact of the 
move on the NCF itself and its future. It is unclear whether the new headquarters 
is intended to house all the NCF’s workforce and operations. To have a meaningful 
impact, the HQ must be more than a Potemkin office, an impressive site to show 
visiting ministers but largely empty of staff and peripheral to the main effort. If the 
NCF embraces the decision, however, and shifts its current workforce and future 
recruitment from Cheltenham (GCHQ) and MoD Corsham to the new site, there are 
short- and longer-term implications.
There is the question of timing and to what extent the move would affect the NCF’s 
current staff, accustomed to its hitherto split-site location. Will the relocation 
decision affect retention and succession planning, particularly as all the constituent 
departments that comprise the NCF have national headquarters based in the South 
or South West? The NCF is currently a small and specialised unit. As such, its 
capability relies on a relatively small number of highly skilled staff. Planning the move 
north should consider its impact on continuity and on the retention of core staff, as 
well as the package necessary to continue to attract the best staff from constituent 
organisations’ respective head offices. This might result in considerably higher 
staffing costs, if, for example, two-to-three-year secondments to the NCF come with 
relocation and accommodation allowances to attract (civilian) staff with existing 
long-term commitments near their parent department’s head office. If the NCF is to 
maintain its integration with parent departments, then the government must accept 
that relocation is likely to incur such costs, at least in the short to medium term.
If the northern headquarters will house the majority of NCF staff, it makes sense 
to choose a location that is future-proofed and can accommodate the projected 
workforce of 3000 by 2030. The new headquarters therefore brings opportunities 
to attract talent from and to the North West of England, but also increases the 
challenges associated with managing the ambitious growth the NCF will pursue over 
the next decade. The right approach to implementation will put operational impact 
at the heart of planning. It will also strike a sensible balance between establishing a 
credible new headquarters and retaining the instrumental link with capabilities that 
will continue to be based in existing government locations. This includes operational 
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capabilities in contributing agencies and departments, as well as the training facilities 
at the Defence Cyber School based at Shrivenham in Oxfordshire. If 3000 personnel 
are to be based at NCF headquarters by 2030, a co-located training facility would be 
a sensible addition – perhaps allowing remote access to the Defence Cyber School.
International cooperation
The hostile state actors, criminal groups and terrorists likely to be targeted by the 
NCF are also regarded as threats by the UK’s closest allies. It makes no sense for 
the NCF to pursue these operations as if the UK alone had the intent and capability 
to act against these targets. Given the strong thread of international cooperation 
running through UK defence and security strategy, the imperative to collaborate 
in offensive cyber will be embraced by the NCF. This is so in an operational sense, 
where the UK is already engaged in operations with NATO and individual allies, but 
also in the more extended sense of shaping the rules and norms of responsible state 
behaviours pertaining to offensive cyber operations, whether conceived of as friendly 
or hostile. Moreover, as has been remarked numerous times by commentators, the 
fastest emerging norm of international affairs is the existence of cyber conflict itself. 
The UK’s use of offensive cyber capabilities must be understood as a contribution to 
this development, mindful of the risk of proliferating both capabilities and undesirable 
behaviours.
Strategically and operationally, the UK’s closest relationships will continue to be 
with the US, wider FVEY and NATO. The UK was the first ally to offer offensive 
cyber capabilities to NATO and the NCF will be a significant contributor to 
NATO’s offensive cyber ambitions via SCEPVA. Beyond NATO, the MoD and 
US Department of Defense 2016 memorandum of understanding implied a division 
of effort between the UK and US in offensive cyber operations.81 This is sensible 
and should be pursued to ensure operational deconfliction, value-for-money and 
effectiveness. This extends beyond simply dividing up target sets and should include 
joint operations and reciprocal personnel secondments to USCYBERCOM. To 
improve interoperability and explore efficiencies, where appropriate the NCF should 
consider joint procurement of services, such as training suites. The NCF should 
review what opportunities exist for pursuing value-for-money in collaboration with 
the US. At the least, the NCF should exploit the benefits of its comparatively late 
development, actively learning lessons from the more mature US experience of 
developing its offensive cyber workforce and procuring services and capabilities 
from the private sector.82 There is considerable scope to achieve strategic outcomes 
in close partnership with allies, but cooperation alone will not deliver the flexibility 
or assurance provided by the development and retention of a sovereign UK 
capability that can be used whenever necessary, including in circumstances in 
which allies are either not in agreement with, or are kept unaware of, UK operations. 
The recent UK Defence and Security Industrial Strategy recognises this need to 
balance development of sovereign offensive cyber capabilities with continued, close 
cooperation with allies.83 Even with close allies, notably the US, these relationships 
must be kept under regular review to ensure cooperation continues to serve UK 
strategic objectives.
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The creation of the NCF will not cause the UK to depart from its historical 
approach to the rules-based international order, nor deviate from its commitments 
to international treaties and institutions. The UK realises, however, that its approach 
to offensive cyber is not that held by all states in the international system. The 
NCF enters a complex and contested environment in which states indicate different 
perspectives on how, when and why cyber operations are permissible or not. To some 
states, an avowed offensive cyber capability is evidence of militaristic intentions, 
even if those same parties conduct or condone precisely those operations the NCF is 
designed to counter. The UK should continue its delicate and cooperative diplomacy 
on cyber operations at the UN and other fora, setting out the need for the NCF when 
queried, explaining what it is for and what it is not for. This includes a more explicit 
commitment to dialogue with the European Union than indicated in the Integrated 
Review, especially as the UK can continue to provide a transatlantic “bridging” 
capability. Transparency about offensive cyber will demonstrate responsible state 
behaviour and help build enduring norms that reduce cyber conflict, not increase 
it. Even if the UK cannot achieve that outcome immediately, there is diplomatic 
utility in being seen to conform to international law and ethics, which will be key to 
promoting the UK as a “responsible, democratic cyber power”.84
Mission focus
One of the key challenges in policy and in practice will be to determine the balance 
between the NCF’s different missions. Should it, for example, focus more of its 
efforts on taking down the infrastructure of ransomware cybercriminals; the tackling 
of online harms in cooperation with other government partners like NCA and 
the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS); counter-cyber 
operations against hostile state actors; or preparing for and engaging in integrated 
military operations? All are covered by the NCF’s stated remit, but ministers must 
determine the rough balance of the NCF’s operations and capability development: 
the NCF will not be able to do everything, nor do everything equally well. To a high 
degree, this will be determined through triangulation of national strategic posture, 
contextual operational requirements (including those of allies), and the availability 
of resources. It will also be shaped by the NCF’s eventual development of its own 
sense of identity and core mission and by the requirements and priorities of other 
cyber-focused units like the 6th (UK) Division, with its diverse portfolio of “cyber, 
electronic warfare, information operations and unconventional capabilities”.85 
Success will also depend on the effective implementation of the defence cyber career 
specialism and planned expansion of the Defence Cyber School.86
The NCF’s mission will not remain static, whatever is decided now, although it 
will likely – in one form or another – remain an integral component of UK national 
cyber power for the foreseeable future. To a significant extent, choices about the 
targets and methods of NCF missions will shape the meaning of the UK’s role 
identity as a responsible, democratic cyber power. The operational environment 
and the complexion of international order will change, as will the interpretation of 
international law, norms and ethics. The military components of the NCF mission 
must be supported by updated doctrine, both for cyber and for CEMA (Cyber and 
Electromagnetic Activities).87
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The NCF is not a conventional cyber security vehicle and should not be allowed to 
distract from wider strategic cyber security goals, nor indeed other national aims and 
ambitions. It is encouraging that MoD has rearticulated its military cyber defence 
mission, but cyber defence should be prioritised in other sectors too.88 There will 
doubtless be a temptation in some quarters – both political and military – to assume 
that the NCF will be able to do things it simply cannot. The NCF should not be 
perceived as a technological fix to problems that offensive cyber operations are ill-
suited to addressing. Its utility as a strategic capability, for instance, must be tempered 
by the realisation that deterrence and compellence in and through cyberspace are 
difficult and all but impossible to achieve solely through cyber means.89 It offers the 
ability to deny, disrupt, degrade and possibly even damage specific threat actors and 
their infrastructures in a targeted fashion, but it will not win a war – metaphorical or 
actual – on its own.90
The NCF’s chief utility may be in counter-cybercrime operations against determined 
serious organised crime groups, but it is not suitable for pursuing and punishing 
all forms of cybercrime. The UK should be especially cautious that the NCF does 
not encourage further militarisation of cyberspace, thereby undercutting its overt 
commitments to international peace and security. This is clearly separate from 
the tactical and operational use of cyber operations to support integrated military 
operations, which will undoubtedly form a significant part of the NCF’s mission.
We do not yet know whether and how the NCF will differ substantively from its 
predecessors. It does, however, appear to represent a step-change in “organising 
for cyber”, if not a reinvention of the overall game itself. According to the Integrated 
Review, the government intends to: “make much more integrated, creative and 
routine use of the UK’s full spectrum of levers – including the National Cyber Force’s 
offensive cyber tools – to detect, disrupt and deter our adversaries.” Creative and 
routine use of offensive cyber suggests a significant counter-cyber role, but the most 
important part of the excerpt is the reference to integration. Offensive cyber is part 
of a wider toolkit to pursue strategic objectives.91 The main preoccupation of cyber 
security and cyber strategy should remain, as UK strategy states clearly, to ensure 
that “the UK is secure and resilient to cyber threats, prosperous and confident in the 
digital world”.92
 
The UK should be 
especially cautious 




April 2021 | The National Cyber Force that Britain Needs? 23 
The National Cyber Force has emerged from a decade of incremental improvement 
in the collaboration between its constituent agencies and departments, a process that 
has not always been smooth or uncontentious. This institutional reform has occurred 
during a transitional period, in which several states have started to talk more openly 
about their offensive cyber capabilities. It has also seen the increased use of offensive 
cyber by states; a rise in the number with offensive cyber capabilities; and significant 
growth in the frequency, sophistication and harm caused by non-state activities, 
particularly cybercrime. The NCF is the latest manifestation of the UK government’s 
responses to this changing operational and strategic environment, as outlined in 
the Integrated Review and elsewhere. It is authorised to act across the full spectrum 
of offensive cyber missions against hostile states, serious organised crime, and 
terrorists.93 This open avowal, coupled with the enthusiasm expressed in recent years 
by government ministers, demonstrate that it is perceived as political “good news” for 
UK defence and security. It is presented as a vehicle of growth, jobs and opportunity 
at a time of difficult decisions about public expenditure and reductions in the armed 
forces in particular.
Beyond the headlines of political approval and the NCF’s broad remit, what will the 
NCF actually do, and why? The threat landscape is formidable and the NCF is not 
backed by limitless resources; it will need to prioritise its missions. Even if it succeeds 
in growing capacity to 3000 personnel by 2030, this would still be half the size of 
USCYBERCOM today. It is not sensible to benchmark NCF capacity or actions 
against the US, but this underlines the need to confront hard choices about how to 
use offensive cyber capabilities to achieve optimal national outcomes in a constrained 
fiscal environment.
These decisions require strategic leadership from ministers and senior officials, so 
important questions about governance and accountability should be addressed at the 
earliest opportunity. Enabling the NCF as an effective force requires clarity about 
its organisational configuration, including the impact of institutional location, and 
mission focus. This will encourage pragmatic transparency about what success looks 
like, how it is going to be delivered, and how it will be measured. Importantly, it 
would be misleading and counterproductive to answer these questions absent the 
critical dimension of international cooperation. UK strategy is international by design 
and emphasises the salience of alliances and partnerships with states and international 
organisations, all respecting the rules-based international order.
Under these headings, we therefore make the following recommendations:
Governance and accountability
• UK government should ensure that its ministerial small group for cyber delivers 
the leadership required to provide top-level accountability and strategic direction. 
Led energetically by a senior minister and supported effectively by officials at 
the centre, it should resemble a reinstatement of the cyber sub-committee of the 
National Security Council.
• UK government should conduct a review of ministerial portfolios containing 
cyber responsibilities across government, potentially improving focus by creating 
5. Reflections and recommendations
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“double-hatted” ministers with larger cyber portfolios that span two or more 
departments.
• UK government should appoint a deputy National Security Adviser for Cyber, to 
elevate the level of sustained central strategic thinking about and co-ordination 
of cyber-related defence, security and intelligence issues across and beyond 
government, including mission priorities for the NCF.
Organisational configuration
• UK government should establish clarity about NCF mission priorities for 
offensive cyber operations, including the process for allocating effort according 
to strategic priorities rather than via bargaining between competing institutional 
actors. Budgetary contributions should not translate directly into control: 
decisions should be made holistically. There is a clear role here for the centre of 
government to coordinate.
• The proposed re-location of NCF headquarters should be carefully planned and 
its short- to medium-term impact on NCF workforce and operations should be 
mitigated by efforts to ensure continuity. Resourcing should reflect the need to 
retain civilian staff and incentivise re-location. It may also be necessary, as the 
NCF grows, to establish a co-located Defence Cyber School presence.
• On workforce strategy, the Cabinet Office should lead a cross-government audit 
across defence, security and intelligence agencies and departments, to ensure 
that workforce plans are aligned and mutually reinforcing. The NCF should be 
situated in the context of the wider Whole Force concept (integrating civilians, 
regular armed forces personnel, reservists, and contractors).
International cooperation
• Operational and strategic cooperation with allies will and should continue, 
particularly within FVEY and NATO, but UK government should identify and 
discuss with other partners, notably European states and the EU, how UK cyber 
expertise can contribute to the collective aspirations of like-minded nations and 
ensure the optimal impact of UK offensive cyber capabilities.
• UK government should be proactive and transparent about the purpose and 
functions of the NCF in relevant international diplomacy, including its retention 
of a sovereign offensive cyber capability, residing principally in the NCF.
• UK government must demonstrate through operational practice and diplomacy 
its commitment to reducing cyber conflict by adherence to international law and 
thereby the promotion of norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace.
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Mission focus
• The NCF mission should add value to, rather than detract from, overall UK cyber 
security priorities; it should be proportionate, not exacerbate the militarisation of 
cyberspace, and operate within clear legal and ethical frameworks.
• The majority of NCF operations should consist of persistent, low-level counter-
cyber operations – targeting the cyber infrastructure of state actor adversaries and 
criminal groups – as well as tactical and operational support to integrated military 
operations. This is sufficiently challenging and high-priority work for the NCF 
to focus on; it is a better focus for the NCF than the more controversial option of 
targeting adversaries’ critical infrastructure.
• UK government, perhaps through the Prime Minister’s Implementation Unit 
and the National Audit Office – and with the oversight of the Intelligence and 
Security Committee of Parliament (ISC) - should continuously assess NCF 
effectiveness. The UK needs to be able to determine whether its offensive cyber 
strategy is succeeding, in line with its legal and ethical obligations, and to correct 
its course if it is not.
This list is not intended to be exhaustive, particularly as the full contours of the 
NCF’s organisation and mission are not in the public domain. We therefore 
encourage continued attention to the NCF from a wide range of stakeholders, 
including: industry, academia, think tanks, civil society and the varied communities 
of cyber security policy and practice.
We do not attempt to outline a UK vision of overall cyber strategy, although the NCF 
will, of course, play a major role in delivering – and in so doing, developing – future 
iterations of national cyber strategy. Nor have we offered an analysis of international 
law as pertains to offensive cyber operations, or the doctrinal framework in which 
they may be deployed. Instead, we provide a modest set of recommendations to 
assist the UK government in considering the emerging role and responsibilities of the 
new National Cyber Force. The UK has an ambitious vision to conduct offensive 
cyber operations as part of a “much more integrated, creative and routine use of the 
UK’s full spectrum of levers”.94 We offer this report to shape the public debate about 
how a responsible “democratic cyber power” should use its growing offensive cyber 
capabilities.
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ACD  Active Cyber Defence
CEMA  Cyber and Electromagnetic Activities
CyOC  NATO Cyber Operations Centre
DCMS  Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport
FVEY  “Five Eyes” intelligence alliance (Australia, Canada, New Zealand,  
   UK, US)
GCHQ  Government Communications Headquarters
GGE  UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of  
   Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International  
   Security
IHL  International humanitarian law
ISC  Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament
MoD  Ministry of Defence
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA  National Crime Agency
NCF  National Cyber Force
NCSC  National Cyber Security Centre
NCSP  National Cyber Security Programme
NOCP  National Offensive Cyber Programme
NSA  National Security Adviser
NSC  National Security Council 
SDSR  Strategic Defence and Security Review
SIS  Secret Intelligence Service (MI6)
SCEPVA Sovereign Cyber Effects Provided Voluntarily by Allies (NATO)
UN  United Nations
USCYBERCOM US Cyber Command
6. Abbreviations
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